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Abstract
A two-country business cycle model featuring nominal rigidities, countercyclical
mark-ups, rule of thumb consumers and government spending reversals is used to iden-
tify inequality predictions that are robust across a range of empirically plausible pa-
rameterizations. These robust inequality restrictions are imposed onto a regime-change
factor model for the United States and its main trade partners to estimate the in-
ternational fiscal spillovers. The effects of U.S. government spending on foreign real
activity are found to be sizable and significant, operating mainly by lowering real in-
terest rates rather than boosting trade balances. In contrast, there seems to be only
limited evidence of state dependence in the international transmission of fiscal policy.
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1 Introduction
The great recession of 2007-09 has reignited the discussion in policy and academic circles
about the economic circumstances under which fiscal policy (and government spending in
particular) can stimulate the economy, both domestically and internationally. On the theo-
retical side, recent contributions have shown that accommodative monetary policy has the
potential to alter the transmission of fiscal policy in closed economy models (Hall, 2009,
Woodford, 2011, and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011) as well as in multi-country
models (Cook and Devereux, 2011 and Coenen et al. 2011).
On the empirical side, Canova and Pappa (2011) report that whenever a fiscal expansion
is associated with negative real short-term interest rates, the domestic fiscal multipliers in
the United States, United Kingdom and the Euro area tend to be somewhat larger than the
estimates based on various identification schemes reported in Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011). Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012) show that the fiscal multipliers are typically larger during recessions whereas, using a
longer sample, Ramey and Zubairy (2014) find little evidence for state-dependent government
spending multipliers in the United States.
While the dynamic response of the real exchange rate to a U.S. fiscal shock has been the
subject of a rapidly growing empirical literature (Monacelli and Perotti, 2011, Ravn, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2012, and Enders, Mu¨ller and Scholl, 2011), little is known on whether
international fiscal spillovers –defined as the response of foreign output to a domestic fiscal
shock conditional on fiscal policy abroad– are (i) positive, (ii) heterogeneous across trade
partners and (iii) varying over time.
In this paper, we address this important gap in the literature by identifying international
fiscal spillovers. Our reference framework is a two-country real business cycle model featur-
ing countercyclical markups (in the spirit of Ravn, Schimtt-Grohe and Uribe, 2012), sticky
prices and wages, rule of thumb consumers (a la Gal´ı, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2007), and
government spending reversals (following Corsetti, Meier and Mu¨ller, 2010 and 2012). The
contributions above have shown that each of these channels has the potential to alter the
effects of government spending.
The theoretical framework is used to derive a set of sign restrictions in the dynamic
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responses to a government spending shock that are robust across a range of empirically
plausible parameterizations of these theoretical mechanisms. The robust sign restrictions are
then imposed onto a change point factor model for the U.S. economy and its main trade
partners over the post-Bretton Woods period. Following Kilian and Murphy (2012), we
impose the additional restriction that the size of the domestic fiscal multiplier cannot be
implausibly higher than the point estimates available in the literature for the U.S.. Finally,
while the empirical model allows fiscal policy in the foreign economy to adjust following a
U.S. government spending shock, the analysis in Section 4 reveals that the response of foreign
government spending is often insignificant across countries and regimes, implying that our
estimates can be interpreted as the international fiscal spillovers holding foreign government
spending constant.
The choice of a factor model fulfills our desire to identify government spending shocks
using large information, which Forni and Gambetti (2010) and Gambetti (2010) have shown
to ameliorate the non-fundamentalness problem raising from fiscal foresight in small-scale
VARs. More specifically, as shown conceptually by Leeper, Walker and Yang (2013), whenever
government policies are anticipated by the public and the variables used by the econometrician
span a smaller information set than available to the agents, identification strategies based
on combinations of VAR residuals fail to recover the structural shocks. The reason is that
the VAR residuals are still contaminated by the component of government spending that the
agents could have predicted using the variables omitted by the econometrician. In contrast,
a large information approach, as taken in this paper, is more likely to avoid the distorted
inference associated with fiscal foresight.
Time-variation is introduced because our sample is characterized by significant changes
in (i) the conduct of fiscal policy (Davig and Leeper, 2006, and Bianchi and Ilut, 2011)
and monetary policy (Cogley and Sargent, 2005), (ii) business cycle conditions and (iii) the
volatility of structural shocks (Primiceri, 2005, and Sims and Zha, 2006), ranging from the
1970s great inflation to the great moderation and finally the great recession. To avoid taking
a stand a-priori on the most relevant source of changes (and its precise timing), our statistical
model identifies in the data the most likely break points.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the probability of a positive re-
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sponse of foreign output to an unanticipated increase of government spending in the United
States is typically larger than fifty percent over the post-Bretton Woods period (especially
after 1984), with the largest effects recorded for Canada and the United Kingdom. Second,
an expansionary U.S. government spending shock leads to a significant decrease in real rates,
both domestically and internationally, but small and insignificant changes in the trade bal-
ances. We interpret this as suggestive that the international transmission of fiscal policy
might operate through a financial channel rather than a trade channel. Third, we find little
support for regime dependence: both the spending multipliers and the international trans-
mission of government spending shocks seem remarkably stable over the statistical different
regimes identified by our factor model, and neither the adoption of the Euro nor the state
of the business cycle (either internationally or domestically) seem to have led to a significant
change in the international transmission of U.S. fiscal policy.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework and illustrates
the way we nest a number of hypotheses for the international transmission of fiscal policy.
It also reports the inequality predictions (for the dynamic effects of a government spending
shock on the endogenous variables) that are robust to a wide perturbation of the parameter
space. These theory-robust sign restrictions are imposed in Section 3 onto a factor model for
the U.S. economy and some of its main trade partners. Results are presented in Section 4
before conclusions. The appendices provide details of the theoretical model, the estimation
of the empirical model, data and variance decomposition. We also relegate to the Appendices
a discussion of the propagation of the various theoretical transmission channels, and further
details on the identification of the sign restrictions.
2 Theoretical framework and sign restrictions
The reference framework is a two-country New-Keynesian model augmented with counter-
cyclical markups, rule of thumb consumers and government spending reversals. Each of these
ingredients is meant to exemplify a specific channel within a broad class of competing models
for the international transmission of fiscal policy.
There are two symmetric countries, and in each country two types of firms: final good and
intermediate good firms. Final good firms combine home and foreign intermediate products
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into a homogeneous consumption good. We assume home bias in the production of the con-
sumption good as a reduced-form device to modeling trade openness. While final good firms
operate under perfect competition, intermediate producers set their price under monopolistic
competition and Calvo price stickiness, using differentiated labor services as the only factor
of production.
On the household side we introduce both asset holders and rule of thumb consumers.
These two types of agents differ in that only asset holders can access international capital
markets and transfer wealth into the future. We assume that the elasticity of substitution
varies procyclically with aggregate output, so as to give rise to countercyclical markups. As
for policy, the monetary institution is captured by a Taylor rule, while the government takes
the shape of a fiscal rule that allows for spending and taxes to respond to the real level of
debt, so as to produce spending reversals.
In the special case where prices and wages are fully flexible, the mark-up is constant, the
budget is balanced at all times and there are no rule-of-thumb consumers, the model boils
down to the standard neo-classical model. Introducing procyclical elasticity of substitution
over this benchmark gives us the counter-cyclical markup model; introducing both price and
wage rigidity coupled with either limited asset market participation or fiscal feedback rules will
provide a benchmark for the rule of thumb model and spending reversal model, respectively.
Because the different specifications allowing for rule of thumb consumers, spending reversals
and countercyclical markups are relatively standard in the literature, details of the model
and derivation of the log-linearized system of equation is relegated to the web Appendix
C. We refer to the web Appendix D for an illustration of differences and similarities in the
propagation of the various theoretical channels.
Using the nested framework where rule of thumb consumers, countercyclical markups,
government spending reversals as well as stickiness in wages and prices are allowed to interact
with each other, we are able to identify sign restrictions for government spending shocks that
are common across empirically plausible perturbations of the parameter space. We find that
following a positive government spending shock, (i) government spending, (ii) taxes, and
(iii) domestic output, increase on impact, while the response of (iv) the government budget
surplus, is non-positive. Furthermore, the nesting model generates a positive comovement
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(v) between short-term nominal interest rate and inflation, and (vi) between consumption
and real exchange rate.1
It is worth noting that our sign restrictions on the joint response of output, budget surplus
and taxes uniquely identify the government spending shock. Any other shock that is included
in the nesting model would generate opposite comovements between primary budget surplus
and taxes. For instance, expansionary TFP, monetary, preference, labor supply, and markup
shocks would increase surplus and decrease taxes. For more details on the computation and
the robustness of these sign restrictions we refer to the web Appendix in Section D.3.
On the basis of this finding, our theory-based strategy to identify a government spending
shock in the data is to impose the common sign restrictions (i) to (vi), which are reported in
Table 1, onto the factor model of Section 3. The ultimate goal is to let the data inform us
about the sign and size of the international fiscal spillovers, namely the dynamic response of
foreign output to unanticipated government purchases in the United States.
3 The empirical framework
In this section, we present the dynamic factor model with independent break points in the
factor loadings and idiosyncratic variances, which will be used to investigate any possible
time-variation in the international transmission of government spending shocks. We lay out
here the estimation and identification procedures while providing a more detailed description
in Appendix B.
The reasoning behind the choice of a model with time-varying parameters is twofold.
First, a large empirical literature has documented significant variation in the evolution of
the volatility of real activity, inflation and interest rates in a number of advanced economies
over the post-WWII period. Second, our sample has been arguably characterized by several
monetary and fiscal regimes, both in the U.S. and its main trade partners, featuring different
degrees of commitment (and success) to fight inflation and stabilize debt.
As discussed in the introduction, the identification of a structural shock requires that no
variable available to the agents (but omitted by the econometrician) could predict the shock.
1The parameter values used in the simulations are drawn from uniform distributions over 10,000 repeti-
tions. Our results indicate that the inequality predictions (i) to (iv) are satisfied in every single draw. The
restrictions (v) and (vi) are instead satisfied in 97.7% and 99.4% of the draws, respectively.
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To confront this problem, which is referred to in the literature as ‘non-fundamentalness’, we
follow Gambetti (2010) and Forni and Gambetti (2010) and use a dynamic factor model as
an efficient way to summarize the information in a large dataset of variables for the U.S. and
its main trade partners.
3.1 A change point factor model
In the empirical model, we assume that a few factors summarize the comovements among a
large cross-section of observables Xit according to the following specification:
Xit = βi,SFt + σi,Qeit (1)
Ft = c +
L∑
j=1
λjFt−j + Σ
1/2vt (2)
where the factors Ft = {f1t, ..fK,t} and L = 2. We allow for independent structural breaks in
the factor loadings βi and the variances σi. As shown below, this specification is preferred to
an alternative with fixed coefficients and to another that allows for breaks in the parameters of
the transition equation. Following Chib (1998), M structural breaks are introduced through
the unobserved discrete state variable S. This state variable is assumed to follow a M + 1
state Markov chain process with a restricted transition probability matrix P˜ .2 The transition
probabilities pij = p (St = j|St−1 = i) are given by
pij > 0 if i = j , pij > 0 if j = i+ 1 (3)
pM+1M+1 = 1 , pij = 0 otherwise.
Analogously, the state variable Q follows an M + 1 Markov chain process with a similarly
restricted transition probability matrix Q˜, which is independent of P˜ .
The process described in (3) is a Markov switching model where transitions are allowed
in a sequential manner. For example, to move from regime 1 to regime 3, the process has
to visit regime 2. Similarly, and without loss of generality, transitions to past regimes are
not allowed. Note, however, that this is not restrictive as two (non-consecutive) regimes that
were similar or identical to one another would simply be given two labels.3
2Kim and Nelson (1999, Chapter 10) provide further examples of factor models with switching parameters.
Del Negro and Otrok (2005) were the first to consider a factor model with time-varying factor loadings.
3The proposed model has computational advantages over a more ‘conventional’ Markov switching specifi-
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3.2 Estimation
The model is estimated using a Gibbs sampling algorithm. Details of the priors and condi-
tional posteriors are given in the appendix. Here we sketch the main steps:
1. Given a value for the factors, draw the VAR parameters.
• The VAR coefficients c, λj have a normal conditional posterior, while the condi-
tional posterior of the covariance matrix Σ is Inverse Wishart.
2. Given a value for the factors, draw the factor loadings (βi,S), the variance of the id-
iosyncratic components σi,Q and the state variable St and Qt.
• Given data on Xi,t and Ft, equation (1) is a system of equations with indepen-
dently switching coefficients and variances. Following Kim and Nelson (1999,
Chapter 9), we use the Multi-Move Gibbs sampling to draw St from the joint con-
ditional density f
(
St|βi,S, σi,Q, P˜ , Qt
)
and Qt from the joint conditional density
f
(
Qt|βi,S, σi,Q, Q˜, Qt
)
.
• Conditional on St and Qt, standard results for regression models can be used and
the coefficients and the variances are simulated from a normal and inverse gamma
distribution.
3. Conditional on St and Qt, elements of P˜ and Q˜ are drawn from the Dirichlet distribu-
tion.
4. Simulate the factors conditional on all the other parameters.
• This is done by employing the methods described in Carter and Kohn (1994).
5. Go to step 1.
The autocorrelations of the retained draws (see Appendix B) show little variation which
provides some evidence of convergence of the algorithm.
cation. In the latter, the labels of the regimes are not identified and researchers typically refer to the properties
of a particular time series so that, for instance, a high regime corresponds to a higher unconditional mean
for a specific endogenous variable. Given the factor structure as well as the large panel dimension, however,
this strategy is not feasible in our context and the choice of a specific variable for labeling the regimes may
not be innocuous. Hence, we adopt the simpler structure for regime transitions described in equation (20).
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3.3 Model comparison
We carry out a model comparison exercise to determine the number and location of breaks
and the number of factors. In particular, we estimate three versions of the factor model: (i)
a model with fixed parameters, (ii) a model with M breaks in the vectors β ′is and parameters
σ′is of the observation equation 1 and (iii) a model with M breaks in the vectors
∑L
j=1 λ
′
js
and the matrix Σ1/2 of the transition equation 2. Note that in (ii) and (iii) we allow for
independent breaks in the coefficients and variances as described above.
We assume M = 1, 2, 3 and in each case allow for the possibility of up to eight factors.
The model comparison is carried out via the Bayesian Deviance Information Criterion (DIC).
Introduced in Spiegelhalter et al. (2002), the DIC is a generalisation of the Akaike informa-
tion criterion – it penalises model complexity while rewarding fit to the data. The DIC is
defined as
DIC = D¯ + pD.
The first term D¯ = E (−2 lnL (Ξi)) =
1
M
∑
i (−2 lnL (Ξi)) where L (Ξi) is the likelihood eval-
uated at the draws of all of the parameters Ξi in the MCMC chain. This term measures good-
ness of fit. The second term pD is defined as a measure of the number of effective parameters in
the model (or model complexity). This is defined as pD = E (−2 lnL (Ξi))−(−2 lnL (E(Ξi)))
and can be approximated as pD =
1
M
∑
i (−2 lnL (Ξi)) −
(
−2 lnL
(
1
M
∑
i
Ξi
))
.4 Prior dis-
tributions on the parameters in our model and the presence of latent variables implies that
the number of parameters (as used in the calculation of the Akaike and Schwarz informa-
tion criterion) do not necessarily represent model complexity. The definition of the effective
number of parameters used in the computation of the DIC avoids this problem. Note that
the model with the lowest estimated DIC is preferred. Calculation of the DIC requires the
calculation of the likelihood of the change point factor model. In our application this is done
via the approximate filter discussed in Kim and Nelson (1999).5
4The first term in this expression is an average of −2 times the likelihood function evaluated at each
MCMC iteration. The second term is (−2 times) the likelihood function evaluated at the posterior mean.
5For an accurate approximation of the likelihood function, Kim and Nelson (Chapter 5, 1999) recommend
to keep track of the regimes in three periods: t, t-1 and t-2. As our empirical model involves (M+1)2 regimes
(in a combination of factor loading and volatility breaks), their recommendation amounts to keep track of
[(M+1)2]3 possible trajectories for the evolution of the parameters. To keep the estimation computationally
tractable, we therefore consider up to four possible regimes (i.e. M=3). This leads to more than four
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Table 2 reports the DIC statistics for each estimated model. The fixed parameter speci-
fications is not favoured by the DIC criterion, which in fact provides support for the model
with 3 (independent) breaks in the factor loadings and the idiosyncratic variances of the
observation equation and seven factors. Note that this model also has a lower DIC than
models (not shown in the table) with drifting factor loadings (DIC= 8275) or parameter drift
and stochastic volatility in the VAR transition equation (DIC=17042). In other words, for
our dataset a model with structural breaks appears favored relative to one that allows for
smooth time-variation. In addition, the model with 3 independent breaks in the parameters
of the observation equation and seven factors is also preferred to restricted specifications
(not reported in Table 2) that only allow for 3 breaks in the factor loadings (DIC=2952)
or 3 breaks in idiosyncratic variances (DIC=-1873.64). Finally, our preferred change point
factor specification compares favorably with a model in which recessions feature as a possible
separate regime as the latter is associated with a DIC statistics of 1837.03.
3.4 Computation of the impulse response functions
We calculate the impulse responses ∆t of Ft to a government spending shock. With these
in hand, the regime-specific impulse responses of each underlying variables can be easily
obtained using the observation equation of the model. The impulse response ∆t is estimated
using a contemporaneous impact matrix A0 which is calculated to satisfy the sign restrictions
in Table 1, which are based on the theoretical framework of Section 2.
In addition to these sign restrictions, we impose ‘plausibility’ restrictions on the short-run
response of domestic and foreign real per-capita GDP growth requiring the contemporaneous
impact of the government spending shock to be less than 0.6%. Coupled with a government
spending-GDP ratio of about 20%, these restrictions map into fiscal multipliers smaller than
three, consistently with both the top end of the structural VAR confidence bands and the
quantitative analysis in Cook and Deveraux (2001) for the home-bias case when the nominal
interest rate responds neither in the domestic nor in the foreign country. As emphasized
by Kilian and Murphy (2012), impulse response functions based on sign restrictions only,
implicitly assume that all admissible models, including those with economically implausible
thousands possible regime permutations.
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fiscal multipliers, are equally likely. Finally, to explore the possibility that the zero lower
bound on the domestic short-term nominal interest rate may have amplified the effects of
fiscal policy during the most recent period, in the fourth regime only we add the additional
restrictions that the short-term rate does not move by more than ten basis points either way
on impact.6
The sign restrictions are implemented as follows: let Σ =PP ′ be the Cholesky decompo-
sition of the transition equation covariance matrix Σ. We draw a 4 × 4 matrix, J , from the
N(0, 1) distribution. We take the QR decomposition of J , which gives us a candidate struc-
tural impact matrix as A0 = PQ. Then, we compute the impulse response of X1,t, ...XN,t.
We check if these impulse responses satisfy our sign and plausibility restrictions. If this is
the case, we store A0,t and move to the next Gibbs iteration.
3.5 Data
We fit the change point factor model described above to an international panel of 143 quarterly
series over the post-Bretton woods sample 1975Q1-2010Q4. The United States is treated as
the domestic economy while the foreign block is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Japan
and the United Kingdom. These countries account for the lion share of trade volumes with
the United States.7 As for the domestic variables, we include –among others– real government
spending, real net taxes, real GDP, CPI, 3-month Treasury bills rate, 10 year government
bond yields, real private consumption expenditure, real wage, investment, terms of trade
and CPI real effective exchange rate. The foreign block includes government spending, real
GDP, personal consumption expenditures, investment, the trade balance, CPI and the 3-
month Treasury bills rate for each country. The inclusion of foreign government spending
fulfills our desire to control for fiscal interventions abroad which, if omitted, may distort the
inference drawn upon the estimated effects of U.S. government spending on its main trade
partners GDP. As shown in Section 4, however, the response of government spending abroad
is typically insignificant.
6While results are not sensitive to the specific cut off of ten basis points, they are meant to exemplify a
scenario in which the short-term nominal rate is forced to remain close to its sub-sample average, which in
the fourth regime is 0.4% on an annual basis.
7China is excluded because of the possible currency manipulation over part of our sample period.
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All real variables are expressed in per capita terms. All variables but interest rates and
terms of trade are in log-difference. A full description of the individual time series and
their sources is provided in Appendix C where we also report the forecast error variance
decomposition and the contribution of the factors to the total variance of the main variables
in our panel (Table 4).
4 Results
In this section, we present the main results of the paper, namely the dynamic responses of
U.S. and some of its main trade partner variables to a U.S. government spending shock. The
impulse responses are obtained using the estimates from the change point factor model of
Section 3. We begin by discussing the statistical regimes identified by the empirical model
and then, we move to the impulse response function analysis. We start with the reaction
of domestic variables before looking at the magnitude of the fiscal spillovers on foreign real
activity. Finally, we explore the international transmission mechanism of the U.S. government
spending shock as well as assess the role of the business cycle abroad and the introduction of
a single currency in the Euro area in confounding our results.
4.1 Regimes
Modeling time-variation in both variances and parameters of a large fiscal panel is attractive
because both the structure of the economy, the volatility of the shocks and the stance of
economic policy may have changed over the post-Bretton Woods period.
Our setup is flexible enough to capture time variation along these dimensions either
through a break in the factor loadings, a break in the variances or a break in both. The
results are reported in Figure 1 where different color bands represent the regimes identified
by the breakpoints in the factor loadings (top panel) and the breakpoints in the idiosyncratic
variances (bottom panel).8
8The 68% central posterior bands for the distribution of the probability pii that the factor loadings remain
in the same regime i are [92.5% 98.4%] for p11, [91.8% 98.2%] for p22 and [96.6% 99.2%] for p33, whereas for
the distribution of the probability Qii associated with the idiosyncratic variances these statistics are [95.9%
99.0%] for Q11, [91.9% 98.2%] for Q22 and [94.4% 98.6%] for Q33. By definition of last regime, p44=Q44=1.
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While the empirical model allows for the break points in the two panels to be unsyn-
chronized, the results in Figure 1 suggests that the last regime has been characterized by a
virtually simultaneous shift in factor loadings and variances. On the other hand, the break
in the variances during the first half of the 1980s seems to have preceded the break in the
factor loadings by a couple of years whereas the beginning of the third regime preceded the
break in variances by one year. The top panel reveals that the second regime lasted longer
than any other regime and largely overlapped with the period of Great moderation in the
idiosyncratic variances recorded in the bottom panel. Finally, the third period appears to
mark the run-up to the fourth regime, which coincides with the global crisis triggered by the
great recession.
4.2 The response of domestic variables and fiscal spillovers
This section reports impulse responses for domestic variables and fiscal spillovers in each of
the regimes estimated on the basis of the factor loading breakpoints identified in the previous
section. In the next section, we will look at the international transmission mechanism and
the role played by the foreign business cycle.
Figures 2 and 3 report the responses of domestic variables to a fiscal shock in the United
States normalized to have a one percent impact on government spending. Given the tight
credible sets for the very high estimates of pii (with i=1 to 3), we compute impulse responses
conditional on being in a particular regime but we have verified that similar results are
obtained when we incorporate regime uncertainty (which however makes the computation
more burdensome).
Each row refers to a different variable while the columns report the central 68% credible
set of the estimated impulse responses for each of the four regimes. A number of interesting
results emerge from Figure 2. There is substantial evidence of a significant increase in US
real GDP in all regimes but the first, where the response of real GDP is only significant on
impact. Estimates of the contemporaneous effect are centered on 0.2 in regimes 2 and 3 and
on 0.25 in regimes 1 and 4.9 The response of inflation is statistically indistinguishable from
9Using the 20% government spending-GDP ratio as rule of thumb, the credible sets in the first row of
Figure 2 would approximately map into short-run multipliers between 0.2 and 2.1 across regimes, with an
average point estimate around 1.1.
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zero at all horizons in regimes 1 and 3, while in regimes 2 and 4 it is positive and significant.
The response of the short-term real rate is flat and insignificant at all horizons in regime
1, while in the other regimes the median responses are strongly negative in the short-term,
albeit still insignificant.10 The median responses of the long-term real rate always lies in
positive territory in regime one. In any other regime, the probability of the long-term rate
being negative in the short-term is larger than 50 percent.
The dynamic effects of a fiscal shock on government spending, net taxes, consumption
and the real effective exchange rate are presented in Figure 3. The response of net taxes
is positive and significant in all regimes. Furthermore, only in the first regime the median
response of government spending always remains in positive territory. The probability of
government spending being negative is larger than 50 percent at all times beyond the first
twenty quarters in regimes 2 and 3, and beyond fifteen quarters in regime 4. The response of
consumption is positive and significant in all regimes, but only on impact in regimes 1 and
4, whereas the real exchange rate significantly depreciates at all times and regimes.
Moving to the response of foreign output, in Figure 4 we note that international spillovers
from a U.S. fiscal expansion tend to be positive and significant, except in the first regime,
where they are still positive, but insignificant. In regimes 2 and 4, spillovers are significantly
positive for all countries in our sample, with the exception of Germany in period 2 where the
spillovers are initially negative and then turn positive after about 10 quarters. In regime 3
instead, spillovers are positive and significant, but only for three out of five countries, namely
Japan, the U.K. and France. The largest peak effect on foreign GDP across all regimes is
found for Canada and the U.K., with the peak impact on Japan, France and Germany being
substantially lower. While the point estimates for the peak effects are in line with the size of
the fiscal spillovers in Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2014), we note that they are significantly larger
than the prediction of any of the theoretical model discussed in Section 2 (Figure 13 in the
web-Appendix D.2).
Finally, we note that the international fiscal spillovers in regime 4 do not appear necessarily
different from the spillovers in the other regimes, suggesting that the last sub-sample is most
10The response of the short-term nominal interest rate in regime 4 is constrained by the restriction meant
to exemplify a zero lower bound type of scenario. Without this restriction, the response of both domestic
and foreign output would be slightly smaller than shown in figures 2 and 4.
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likely capturing a break in macroeconomic volatility, consistent with the evidence in Figure
5. In other words, we find little empirical support for the notion that the international
transmission mechanism changed significantly during the most recent global crisis.
4.3 The international transmission mechanism
In this section, we shed light on the determinants of the international spillovers from a
U.S. fiscal stimulus to foreign economic activity. We do so by discussing the estimated
responses of the trade balance, short-term real rates, consumption and investment in foreign
countries, which are reported in Figures 5 to 8. Starting with the trade balance, we notice
that the impulse responses are typically insignificant across regimes and countries. The only
exceptions are concentrated in regime 2, mostly for the U.S./U.K. and only to a lesser extent
for Japan and France. Overall, central estimates for the response of the US trade balance are
negative and persistent, consistent with the twin deficits hypothesis. However, the effects of
government spending shocks on the trade balance are estimated to be quantitatively small,
both in the US and abroad, with peak effects below 0.2 across all regimes and countries.
Even for Canada, the only country in our sample for which central estimates indicate a trade
surplus, the estimates are below 0.1. The results that the trade balance seems unlikely to
drive fiscal spillovers is in line with the findings in Corsetti and Mu¨ller (2014).
On the other hand, we find evidence that fiscal spillovers operate by lowering the real
interest rate abroad (see Figure 6) in all regimes but regime 1. In regime 2, which spans
most of the time in our sample, the fall in the short-term real rate is statistically significant
for all countries except Canada; in regimes 3 and 4 the probability of a fall in real rates
in the aftermath of the fiscal stimulus remains persistently above 50% for all countries. In
other words, Figures 5 and 6 suggest that the mechanism by which government spending
shocks spill-over to foreign countries might operate through a financial channel, rather than
the trade balance.
The decrease in short-term real rates is consistent with the estimated responses of con-
sumption and investment, reported in Figures 7 and 8. In regime 2, the response of consump-
tion is positive and significant for all countries except Germany, where the response remains
always insignificant. In regime 4, the increase in consumption is positive and significant for
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Canada, Japan and France, but insignificant for Germany. The response of consumption in
the U.K. is instead significantly negative after about 10 quarters. In regimes 1 and 3 instead,
the point estimate for the response of consumption is always positive, but never significant,
with the exception of Japan in regime 3.
The adjustment in investment broadly mimics the adjustment in consumption across
countries and regimes, with central estimates of the impulse responses being positive for all
countries and regimes a few quarters after the shock, but attaining statistical significance only
over a subset of country-regime pairs. In regimes 2 and 4, investment increases significantly in
all countries, with the exception of the U.K. in regime 4. In regime 1 instead, the increase in
investment is always statistically indistinguishable from zero, while in regime 3 the response
is significant only in Canada and France.
Finally, in Figure 9 we report impulse responses for foreign government spending. In
almost all countries and regimes we find little evidence of significant responses in foreign
spending, with error bands generally being very wide around central estimates (France and
Canada represent sporadic exceptions). Arguably, lower real interest rates induced by the
US fiscal stimulus could improve fiscal sustainability abroad and induce a delayed increase in
spending in foreign countries. But we find little evidence in support of this hypothesis.
In summary, we find little evidence of structural breaks in the transmission of fiscal
spillovers after 1985, when U.S. fiscal policy begins to produce significant domestic and cross-
border effects. The international transmission of government spending shocks does not appear
to operate through the trade balance (with the only possible exception of regime 2) but most
likely through a financial channel in the form of a decrease in real rates abroad, which in turn
stimulates consumption and investment.
4.4 State-dependence
The regimes in our factor model are identified statistically. But a possible economic interpre-
tation is that they reflect different states of the domestic or the international business cycle.
Indeed, a prominent literature for the U.S., exemplified by the contributions of Auerbach
and Gorodichenko (2012) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014), has studied (reaching opposite
conclusions) whether the government spending multiplier is larger during periods of slack in
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economy activity. In analogy to these studies, we ask whether the international transmission
of fiscal policy depends on the presence of a recession abroad or on the introduction of a
single currency among some of the U.S. main trade partners.
More specifically, we estimate two Factor Augmented VAR models where the stochastic
regime shifts are replaced with a dummy variable. In the first model, the dummy takes the
value of one during periods in which at least one of the countries in the panel is in recession
and takes the value of zero otherwise.11 The second model sets the value of the dummy to one
after the first quarter of 1999 to account for any possible break associated with the adoption
of the Euro.
Figure 10 records the response of foreign output to a U.S. government spending shock
conditioned on the two regimes, with the left (right) column corresponding to periods of
recessions (no recessions) abroad. The median responses appear remarkably similar across the
two regimes, suggesting that international fiscal spillovers tend to vary neither with the state
of the foreign economy nor with the state of the domestic economy. The results are similar
when the impulse responses are conditioned to the sub-samples before and after adoption of
the Euro, thereby providing little evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the transmission
of U.S. fiscal policy (in Europe) changed systematically after this date (see Figure 11).
5 Conclusions
What are the effects of a fiscal expansion in the United States on foreign real activity? This
paper has searched for international fiscal spillovers using theory-robust sign restrictions and
a factor model. Our evidence suggests that an increase in U.S. government spending tends
to have a positive influence on its main trade partners. The transmission mechanism appears
to operate through a financial channel (as exemplified by negative real rates abroad) rather
than a trade channel and appears to have been remarkably stable over time.
The ongoing period of policy retrenchment is likely to offer new challenges for modelling
the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies. Furthermore, the current reversal of
government spending and other policy interventions is suggestive of the possible start of a
new regime. Whether the international fiscal spillovers associated with a newly identified
11We use NBER (OECD) recession dates (recession indicators) for the U.S. (for the remaining countries).
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fiscal consolidation era may be significantly different from the past is of course an empirical
question. But the strategy outlined in this paper appears well placed to evaluate in future
research any possible change in the international transmission of fiscal policy.
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Table 1: Theory-robust sign restrictions imposed in the empirical model
Variable Sign Restriction
US real government spending ≥ 0
US real net taxes ≥ 0
(US real primary fiscal surplus)t ≤ 0 for t = 1, 2
US real GDP ≥ 0
Corr(US consumption, US real exchange rate) ≥ 0
Corr(US inflation, US short-term nominal rate) ≥ 0
Note: An increase in the real exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation. Unless
otherwise stated, the inequality constraints are imposed only on impact.
Table 2: Model Selection via Deviance Information Criterion
2 Factors 3 Factors 4 Factors 5 Factors 6 Factors 7 Factors 8 Factors
Fixed Parameter 14880.5 8950.2 6757.3 4521.5 2525.4 1345.7 429.5
1 break (obs.) 7520.9 3944.1 2325.4 308.8 -1068.3 -1075.6 -3807.1
2 breaks (obs.) 6612.8 3100.1 -408.1 -1749.2 -3333.1 -4082.6 -4190.9
3 breaks (obs.) 3591.8 1560.1 -2291.3 -3542.9 -4245.1 -6200.9 -5566.7
1 break (trans.) 10290.4 8348.6 5994.9 4554.5 2433.0 502.5 796.2
2 breaks (trans.) 9421.8 7518.3 5711.1 4127.3 3361.7 1039.8 1014.6
3 breaks (trans.) 9869.9 7541.1 5710.7 3965.1 2249.0 1155.9 297.8
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Figure 1: Identified breakpoints and regime probabilities.
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Figure 2: Dynamic responses of U.S. variables to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S. government
spending. Central 68% credible set.
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Figure 3: Dynamic responses of U.S. variables to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S. government
spending. An increase in the real exchange rate corresponds to a depreciation. Central 68% credible set.
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Figure 4: Dynamic responses of foreign real GDP to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S.
government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 5: Dynamic responses of the trade balance to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S.
government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 6: Dynamic responses of short-term real rates to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S.
government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 7: Dynamic responses of foreign consumption to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S.
government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 8: Dynamic responses of foreign investment to a government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact on U.S.
government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 9: Dynamic responses of foreign government spending to a US government spending shock normalized to have a 1% impact
on U.S. government spending. 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 10: Dynamic responses of foreign GDP to a US government spending shock normalized to
have a 1% impact on U.S. government spending. The impulse responses are conditional to recession
in at least one country (regime 1) and no recession (regime 2). 68% central posterior credible set.
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Figure 11: Dynamic responses of foreign DGP to a US government spending shock normalized to
have a 1% impact on U.S. government spending. Impulse responses in regime 1 refer to the pre-1999
period, responses in regime 2 are post-1999. 68% central posterior credible set.
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A Gibbs sampler for the switching factor model
Consider the factor model defined by the following equations:
Xit = βi,SFt + σi,Qeit (4)
Ft = c +
L∑
j=1
λjFt−j + Σ
1/2vt (5)
where S follows aM+1 state Markov chain process with a restricted transition probability
matrix P˜ . Similarly, the state variable Q follows an M + 1 Markov chain process with a
similarly restricted transition probability matrix Q˜.
The Gibbs sampler proceeds in the following steps:
Step 1. Sampling the parameters of the observation equation: c, λj and Σ. Conditional on
an initial value for Ft (obtained via a principal component estimator), equation 5 is a
Bayesian VAR model. Collecting the VAR coefficients (K × (K × L+ 1)) vector Υ the
LHS of equation 5 into the matrix Yt and the RHS (ie lags and the intercept terms) of
equation 5 into the matrix xt, the conditional posterior of the VAR coefficients and the
covariance matrix is given by
G (Υ\Σ) ˜N(vec(Υ∗),Σ⊗ (x∗′x∗)
−1
)
G (Σ\Υ) ˜IW (S∗, T ∗)
where
Υ∗S = (x
∗′x∗)
−1
(x∗′Y ∗)
S∗ = (Y ∗ − x∗Υ∗)′ (Y ∗ − x∗Υ∗)
where Y ∗ = [Yt; YD], x
∗ = [xt;XD]. YD and XD are dummy observations that implement
the normal inverse Wishart prior and are defined as
YD =

diag(γ1σ1...γNσN )
τ
0N×(P−1)×N
..............
diag (σ1...σN )
..............
01×N
 , and XD =

JP⊗diag(σ1...σN )
τ
0NP×1
0N×NP 0N×1
..............
01×NP c

where σ1....σN represents standard deviations of the error term of an AR model estimated
using the initial prinicipal component estimate of the factors, γ1 to γN denotes the prior mean
for the coefficients on the first lag, τ is the tightness of the prior on the VAR coefficients and
c is the tightness of the prior on the constant terms. We set τ = 0.01 and c = 0.000001 in
our implementation. The results are robust to higher values for τ but these results become
imprecise in regimes with a few number of observations.
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Step 2. Sampling the parameters of the transition equation: βi,S. Given a draw for Ft, St, Qt
and σi,Q the observation equation 4 is a sequence of linear regressions in each of the
M regimes and heteroscedastic disturbances. The pattern of heteroscedasticity is de-
termined by σi,Q and the state variable Qt. The factor loadings in regime St = j are
sampled from
βi,S ∼ N (β
∗,M∗)
where the conditional mean and variance are estimated using the Kalman filter that
takes the discrete changes in σi,Q into account. In other words, for each i and S = s,
we express the regression model as the following state space system
Xt = βs,tFt + σQet
βs,t = βs,t−1
The final iteration of the Kalman filter delivers β∗ = βs,T\T and M
∗ = PT\T . The
Kalman filter is initialised using the prior mean B0\0 = Bˆi where Bˆi represents the
estimated factor loadings using the principal component estimator. The prior variance
P0\0 equals Ik×0.2 where Ik is a k×k identity matrix. Note that this is an application
of the Carter and Kohn (2004) algorithm.
Step 3. The variance of the idiosyncratic components σi,Q for Q = j is sampled from the inverse
Gamma density:
σ2i,Q˜IG (σ
∗
i , T + V0)
where σ∗i = e˜
′
ite˜it+σ0. The residual e˜t = ι [Q = j]
(∑S
s I [S = s]
(
X˜it − F˜tβi,S
))
where
I [S = s] is an indicator function while ι [Q = j] selects observations when regime Q = j.
We set the prior scale parameter σ0 = 0.1 and the prior degrees of freedom V0 = 1.
Step 4. Sampling the markov states: S. Given a draw of the parameters of the observation
equation from step 2 and an initial value for the transition probabilities P˜ and the
unobserved factors, the unobserved state variable S is drawn using Multi-Move Gibbs
sampling to draw from the joint conditional density f
(
St|Xt, Ft, βi,S, σi,Q, P˜ , Qt
)
. Kim
and Nelson (1999, chapter 9) show that the Markov property of St implies that
f (St|Zt) = f (ST |XT )
T−1∏
t=1
f (St|St+1, Xt) (6)
where we have suppressed the conditioning arguments. This density can be simulated
in two steps:
• Calculating f (ST |XT ): The Hamilton (1989) filter provides f (St|Xt) , t = 1, ....T. The
last iteration of the filter provides f (ST |XT ) .Note that conditioning on Qt allows us
to take into account changes in σi across time when running the filter.
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• Calculating f (St|St+1, Xt): Kim and Nelson (1999) show that
f (St|St+1, Xt) ∝ f (St+1|St) f (St|Xt) (7)
where f (St+1|St) is the transition probability matrix and f (St|Xt) is obtained via
Hamilton (1989) filter in step a. Kim and Nelson (1999) (pp. 214) show how to sample
St from (7).
Step 5. Sampling the Markov states: Qt. Given the parameters of the observation equation,
a draw for the transition probabilities Q˜, the Markov states St and the factors, the
algorithm in Step 4 above is used to simulate Qt.
Step 6. Sampling the transition probabilities: P˜ . The prior for the non zero elements of the
transition probability matrix pij is of the following form
p0ij = D (uij)
where D(.) denotes the Dirichlet distribution and uij = 15 if i = j and uij = 1 if
i 6= j. This choice of uij implies that the regimes are fairly persistent. The posterior
distribution is:
pij = D (uij + ηij)
where ηij denotes the number of times regime i is followed by regime j.
Step 7. Sampling the transition probabilities Q˜ : The priors and conditional posteriors are in
step 5.
Step 8. Sampling the factors: Ft Given a draw for the parameters of the observation and
transition equation and the state variable St the Carter and Kohn (1994) algorithm is
used to draw from the conditional posterior of Ft.
To compute the impulse responses, we use 500,000 replications of the Gibbs sampler,
discarding the first 10,000 replications as burn-in and retaining those draws which satisfy the
sign restrictions set out above. In Figure 12 below we plot the recursive means of a sample
of 1000 retained draws. The stability of these provides evidence for convergence.
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Figure 12: Recursive means of Gibbs draws.
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B Data description and variance decomposition
The variables in the dataset used for the estimation of the factor model are listed in ta-
ble 3 below. The table also reports the data source and the transformation applied to the
variable. BEA refers to Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/), FRED is
Federal Reserve Economic Data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), IFS is the IMF’s In-
ternational Financial Statistics (www.imfstatistics.org/) and GFD is the Global Financial
Database (www.globalfinancialdata.com). LD refers to the log difference transformation.
US fiscal variables are constructed as follows:
• Government spending: government consumption expenditures and gross investment
(BEA Table 1.15 Line 21) deflated by GDP deflator (FRED series id GDPDEF) and
divided by population ( FRED series id POP).
• Net Taxes: current receipts (BEA Table 3.1 Line 1) minus current transfer payments
(BEA Table 3.1 Line 17) and interest payments (BEA Table 3.1 Line 22) deflated by
GDP deflator and divided by population
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Table 3: Data description, sources and transformations
Variable Source Transformation
Industrial Production index FRED LD
Industrial Production index Final Product FRED LD
Industrial Production index Consumer Goods FRED LD
Industrial Production index Durable Consumer Goods FRED LD
Industrial Production index Non-Durable Consumer Goods FRED LD
Industrial Production: Business Equipment FRED LD
Industrial Production: Materials FRED LD
Industrial Production: Durable Materials FRED LD
Industrial Production: Non-Durable Materials FRED LD
Industrial Production: Manufacturing FRED LD
Industrial Production: Electric and Gas Utilities FRED LD
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods FRED LD
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods FRED LD
Personal Consumption Expenditures: services FRED LD
Fixed Private investment FRED LD
Fixed Non-residential Private investment FRED LD
Fixed residential private investment FRED LD
Real Exports FRED LD
Real Imports FRED LD
Capacity Utilization: Total Industry FRED LD
Industrial Production: Nondurable Manufacturing (NAICS) FRED LD
Employment (construction) FRED LD
Employment (health and education) FRED LD
Employment (financial services) FRED LD
Employment (good producing) FRED LD
Employment (government) FRED LD
Employment (information services) FRED LD
Employment (leisure) FRED LD
Employment (natural resources mining) FRED LD
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Employment (other services) FRED LD
Employment (professional and business services) FRED LD
Employment (retail trade) FRED LD
Employment (service providing ind) FRED LD
Employment (trade transportation utilities) FRED LD
Employment (wholesale trade) FRED LD
Civilian employment FRED LD
Civilian labor force FRED LD
Civilian participation rate FRED LD
Nonfarm Business Sector: Average Weekly Hours FRED LD
Average Weekly Overtime Hours of Production and Nonsupervisory FRED LD
Employees: Manufacturing
Unemployment Rate FRED none
Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment FRED LD
Civilians Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks FRED LD
Civilians Unemployed for 15-26 Weeks FRED LD
Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks FRED LD
Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks & Over FRED LD
Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over FRED LD
Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started FRED LD
Housing Starts in Northeast Census Region FRED LD
Housing Starts in Midwest Census Region FRED LD
Housing Starts in South Census Region FRED LD
Housing Starts in West Census Region FRED LD
ISM Manufacturing: New Orders Index FRED none
ISM Manufacturing: Inventories Index FRED none
ISM Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries Index FRED none
GDP deflator FRED LD
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index FRED LD
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index Less FRED LD
Food and Energy
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items Less FRED LD
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Food & Energy
Gross Private Domestic Investment: Chain-type Price Index FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Energy FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Housing FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Apparel FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Transportation FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Medical Care FRED LD
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Other G. and S. FRED LD
Export Price IFS LD
Import Price IFS LD
Description: Economist All-Commodity Dollar Index GFD LD
West Texas Intermediate Oil Price (US$/Barrel) GFD LD
Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons FRED LD
Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour FRED LD
Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost FRED LD
Federal Funds Rate FRED none
6-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate GFD none
USA 1-year Constant Maturity Note Yield GFD none
USA 5-year Note Constant Maturity Yield GFD none
6mth-3mth GFD none
12mth-3mth GFD none
10yr-3mth GFD none
AAA-10yr GFD none
AAB-10yr GFD none
M1 Money Stock GFD LD
MZM Money Stock GFD LD
M2 Money Stock GFD LD
Monetary Base GFD LD
Non Borrowed Reserves GFD LD
Total Reserves GFD LD
Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks GFD LD
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Total Consumer Credit Outstanding GFD LD
S&P 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension) GFD LD
Dow Jones Industrials Total Return Index GFD LD
S&P 500 Monthly Dividend Yield GFD none
S&P 500 P/E Ratio (As Reported Earnings) GFD none
Canada Real GDP Per Capita IFS LD
Canada CPI All items IFS LD
Canada 3 month Treasury Bill Rate IFS none
Canada Real Consumption IFS LD
Canada Gross Fixed Capital Formation IFS LD
Japan Real GDP per capita IFS LD
Japan CPI IFS LD
Japan 3 month Treasury Bill Rate IFS none
Japan Real Consumption IFS LD
Japan Gross Fixed Capital Formation IFS LD
Germany real GDP per capita IFS LD
Germany CPI IFS LD
Germany 3 month Treasury Bill Rate IFS none
Germany Real Consumption per capita IFS LD
Germany Gross Fixed Capital Formation IFS LD
UK Real GDP Per Capita IFS LD
UK CPI IFS LD
UK 3 month treasury bill rate IFS none
UK Real Consumption per Capita IFS LD
UK Gross Fixed Capital Formation IFS LD
France Real GDP per capita IFS LD
France CPI IFS LD
France 3 month treasury bill rate IFS none
France Consumption Per Capita IFS LD
France Gross fixed Capital formation IFS LD
Canadian Dollars to 1 US Dollar Real exchange Rate IFS LD
Yen Per Dollar real exchange rate IFS none
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German Marks Per Dollar real exchange rate IFS none
UK Pounds Per Dollar real exchange rate IFS none
French Francs Per Dollar real exchange rate IFS none
Government Spending per capita Authors’ calculations none
Net Taxes per capita Authors’ calculations none
Real GDP Per Capita FRED LD
CPI FRED LD
3 month treasury bill yield GFD none
10 year Govt Bond Yield GFD none
Real Consumption expenditure per capita FRED LD
Terms of Trade IFS LD
Real Effective Exchange rate IFS LD
Canada Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure OECD LD
Japan Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure OECD LD
Germany Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure OECD LD
UK Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure ONS LD
France Real Government Final Consumption Expenditure OECD LD
Canada Real Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation OECD LD
Japan Real Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation OECD LD
France Real Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation OECD LD
UK Real Government Gross Fixed Capital Formation ONS LD
Canada Real Exports GFD LD
Japan Real Exports GFD LD
Germany Real Exports GFD LD
UK Real Exports GFD LD
France Real Exports GFD LD
Canada Real Imports GFD LD
Japan Real Imports GFD LD
France Real Imports GFD LD
Germany Real Imports GFD LD
UK Real Imports GFD LD
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Table 4: Contribution to the conditional and unconditional variance (%)
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Total Variance
variable 1 quarter 4 quarters 20 quarters by the factors
REGIME 1
Real GDP 0.3 5.3 7.8 59.6
Inflation 12.7 11.1 10.0 85.8
Short-term rate 8.4 8.3 8.5 97.9
Long-term rate 3.3 5.3 6.4 97.5
Govt spending 18.6 19.7 17.9 10.7
Net taxes 0.0 2.3 5.5 60.0
Consumption 3.3 10.8 11.1 49.1
Exchange rate 5.0 10.5 11.3 43.4
REGIME 2
Real GDP 0.6 9.3 11.1 63.6
Inflation 5.5 5.1 11.4 94.7
Short-term rate 5.9 4.3 9.7 99.5
Long-term rate 5.8 4.0 6.9 97.2
Govt spending 24.8 21.8 20.0 20.0
Net taxes 0.1 3.8 8.0 33.2
Consumption 4.7 13.8 13.7 54.2
Exchange Rate 17.3 19.5 18.3 41.7
REGIME 3
Real GDP 0.5 8.2 9.9 71.0
Inflation 8.3 7.3 10.6 86.9
Short-term rate 11.7 10.9 9.7 98.0
Long-term rate 6.3 7.4 7.8 98.3
Govt spending 20.6 19.8 18.4 33.1
Net taxes 0.0 2.6 6.5 73.0
Consumption 3.1 11.3 12.2 79.5
Exchange Rate 13.2 15.8 15.4 63.9
REGIME 4
Real GDP 1.6 6.5 7.4 74.0
Inflation 7.0 7.7 12.0 82.1
Short-term rate 0.0 1.4 5.3 97.7
Long-term rate 2.7 3.5 5.9 97.6
Govt spending 37.9 32.2 25.5 16.9
Net taxes 0.0 2.4 4.7 12.1
Consumption 2.9 8.4 8.3 71.4
Exchange Rate 20.9 22.9 21.5 79.5
Note: the first three columns report the percentage of variance explained by the
government expenditure shock at horizons of one, four and twenty quarters. The last
column refers to the percentage of unconditional variance explained by the factors.
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C The model -Web-Appendix-
C.1 Firms
Final good firms. The consumption good is produced by final good firms as a bundle of
home and foreign intermediate goods, and it is sold to consumers in perfect competition. In
turn intermediate goods are produced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms
at home and abroad under imperfect competition. The subscript i ∈ [0, 1] is used to index
intermediate good firms together with their products and prices. We denote intermediate
home goods by YH,t(i) and imported goods by YF,t(i). Final good firms minimize expenditure
subject to the aggregation constraint:
Ct = ΦY
v/2
H,t Y
1−v/2
F,t , 1 ≤ v ≤ 2,
where Φ = (v/2)v/2(1− (v/2))v/2, Ct denotes the aggregate consumption good, and YHt and
YFt are the bundles of goods produced in the home and foreign country, respectively. The
parameter v captures home bias in the production of the consumption good: the higher is v,
the more closed is the economy. In the special case where v = 1 there is no home-bias while
for v = 2 the economy is autarkic. Final good firms in the foreign country are symmetric, with
the aggregation technology having weight v/2 on the foreign good as in Cook and Deveraux
(2011). YHt and YFt are CES aggregates over a continuum of goods:
YHt =
 1∫
0
YH,t(i)
1−1/εY,tdi

1
(1−1/εY,t)
, YFt =
 1∫
0
YF,t(i)
1−1/ε∗Y,tdi

1
(1−1/ε∗
Y,t
)
,
where εY,t > 1 and ε
∗
Y,t > 1 are the time varying elasticities of substitution for the home
and foreign goods, respectively. We assume that the elasticity of substitution is procyclical
and follows the process εˆY,t = ηyˆH,tξt for the home country good, and εˆ
∗
Y,t = ηyˆF,t for the
foreign country good, where εˆY,t and yˆH,t are used to denote percentage deviations of the
home elasticity of substitution and intermediate output from their steady-state values and ξt
captures a mark-up shock, which follows a log-linear AR(1) stochastic process. The parameter
η > 0 governs the procyclical behavior of the elasticity of demand: the higher is η, the more
countercyclical is the mark-up.12
Expenditure minimization implies the following price indices associated with the home
and foreign intermediate good bundles:
PH,t =
 1∫
0
PH,t(i)
1−εY,tdi

1
1−εY,t
, PF,t =
 1∫
0
PF,t(i)
1−ε∗Y,tdi

1
1−ε∗
Y,t
,
12This reduced form process for the elasticity of substitution is intended to capture the dynamics of the
mark-up as described by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
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and the aggregate CPI is Pt = P
v/2
H,t P
1−v/2
F,t . Minimization of expenditure by the domestic final
good producers yields the following demand functions for the home and foreign intermediate
good bundles:
Y DH,t =
v
2
Pt
PH,t
Ct,
Y DF,t =
(
1−
v
2
) Pt
PF,t
Ct.
The demand for a generic variety YH,t(i) and YF,t(i) is given by:
Y DH,t(i) =
[
PH,t(i)
PH,t
]−εY,t
Y DH,t,
Y DF,t(i) =
[
PF,t(i)
PF,t
]−ε∗Y,t
Y DF,t.
Symmetric demand functions can be derived for the foreign final good producer.
Intermediate good firms. Home intermediate firms employ labor to produce a differen-
tiated good according to the production function:
YH,t(i) = ΨtLt(i),
where Ψt is a standard TFP shock that follows an AR(1) log-linear stochastic process and
Lt(i) is an aggregator of differentiated labor services supplied by the households, which we
define below. The unit cost of labor services is denoted byWt and is interpreted as the aggre-
gate nominal wage index. Firm imaximizes profits defined as Πt(i) = PH,t(i)YH,t(i)−WtLt(i),
and resets the price according to Calvo pricing, where the probability of readjusting prices
in each period is 1 − δp. The home firm faces the elasticity of substitution εY,t when selling
to home and foreign customers, as well as to the domestic government. Profit maximization
leads to the following optimal price setting condition:
P˜H,t(i) =
Et
∞∑
s=0
εY,t+sΛt,t+sδ
s
p
Wt+s
At+s
Yt+s(i)
Et
∞∑
s=0
(εY,t+s − 1)Λt,t+sδspYt+s(i)
, (8)
where Et denotes the expectation operator, P˜H,t(i) is the new price set by the firms that are
allowed to readjust their prices and Λt,t+j = β
j(Pt/ϑtC
−σ
A,t)(ϑt+sC
−σ
A,t+j/Pt+j) is the stochastic
nominal discount factor of the households, which we derive in the following section. In the
aggregate, the price index for the home good follows the process given by:
PH,t =
[
(1− δp) P˜
1−εY,t
H,t + δpP
1−εY,t
H,t−1
]1/(1−εY,t)
. (9)
The behavior of foreign firms and the foreign good price index can be described analogously.
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C.2 Households
The world is populated by a unit measure of monopolistically competitive households indexed
by h ∈ [0, 1] (Erceg et al., 2000). Each household supplies differentiated labor services Lt(h)
to the production sector and receives a wage payment Wt(h). These different types of labor
are combined into the following Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, which is used as an input in the
intermediate sector:
Lt =
 1∫
0
Lt(h)
1−1/εLdh

1
(1−1/εL)
,
where εL denotes the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor services. The
unit cost associated with the labor index is:
Wt =
 1∫
0
Wt(h)
1−εLdh

1
1−εL
,
and the aggregate demand for labor services of type h is:
Lt(h) =
[
Wt(h)
Wt
]−εL
Lt. (10)
A fraction 1−λ of households are asset holders and they are indexed by subscript A. These
households are the owners of firms and have access to the financial market. The remaining
fraction of households λ do not participate to the asset market and are indexed by N .
Asset holders. In each period, the asset holding household derives utility from consump-
tion and disutility from work. This household maximizes lifetime utility defined as:
UA,t(h) = Et
∞∑
s=0
βsϑt+s
[
1
1− σ
C1−σA,t+s(h)−
χt+s
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕA,t+s(h)
]
, (11)
where β is the discount factor, σ governs the degree of risk aversion, ϕ is the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, ϑt is a preference shock and χt is a labor supply shock, both
following a standard AR(1) log-linear process.
Households supply labor services to a continuum of firms in their own country and receive
in return the nominal average wageWt(h). Each period households receive profits Υt and pay
lump sum taxes TA,t. Letting Ωt+1 denote the payoff in units of domestic currency in period
t + 1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, the budget constraint of the household is
given by:
PtCA,t(h) + EtΛt,t+1Ωt+1(h) =Wt(h)LA,t(h) + Υt(h)− TA,t(h) + Ωt(h),
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where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for the one-period ahead nominal payoffs relevant
to the domestic household. Foreign asset holder households have analogous preferences and
face an analogous budget constraint.
Combining the first order conditions with respect to CA,t(h) and Ωt+1(h) yields (after
invoking symmetry and thus dropping the household-specific index h):
Etβ
(
CA,t+1
CA,t
)−σ
ϑt+1
ϑt
Pt
Pt+1
= EtΛt,t+1. (12)
If EtΛt,t+1 is the price of a riskless one-period discount bond paying one unit of domestic
currency in t + 1, and Rt = 1/ (EtΛt,t+1) is its gross return, the equation above can be
rearranged to obtain the standard Euler condition:
βRtEt
(
CA,t+1
CA,t
)−σ
ϑt+1
ϑt
Pt
Pt+1
= 1. (13)
Under the assumption of complete asset markets, a first order condition analogous to (12)
must hold for the foreign country:
Etβ
(
C∗A,t+1
C∗A,t
)−σ (
StP
∗
t
St+1P
∗
t+1
)
= EtΛt,t+1,
where St denotes the nominal exchange rate (home price of the foreign currency), and P
∗
t =
P
∗v/2
F,t P
∗1−v/2
H,t is the foreign CPI. The real exchange rate is defined as Qt = StP
∗
t /Pt and home
terms of trade as Tt = StP
∗
F,t/PH,t. Combining the domestic and the foreign Euler conditions
to eliminate Λt,t+1 and assuming that the law of one price holds in individual goods and both
home and foreign composite consumption goods (i.e., so that PF,t = SP
∗
F,t), it is possible to
obtain:
ϑtC
σ
A,t = C
∗σ
A,tQt = C
∗σ
A,tT
v−1
t , (14)
which implies that state contingent marginal utilities are equalized across countries.
Forward looking households set wages in staggered contracts. Each period, households
reset their wage with probability 1 − δw. In any period in which the household is allowed
to renegotiate the wage, the household maximizes the utility function in (11) subject to a
sequence of demand schedules for their labor type (10). The first order condition reads:
∞∑
s=0
(βδw)
sEt
LA,t+s|t
χt+sCσA,t+s
{
W˜t
Pt+s
−
εL
εL − 1
MRSA,t+s|t
}
= 0, (15)
where LA,t+s|t denotes the quantity demanded at time t + s of a labor type whose wage
was renegotiated at time t, and MRSA,t+s|t ≡ χt+sC
σ
A,t+sL
ϕ
A,t+s|t is the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor at time t + s conditional on the wage being
renegotiated at time t.
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Non asset holders. Non asset holders, also known as rule of thumb consumers (ROT)
choose consumption CN,t and supply labor LN,t to maximize the flow of utility UN,t on a
period-by-period basis:
UN,t(h) =
1
1− σ
C1−σN,t (h)−
χt
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕN,t (h),
subject to the constraint that consumption expenditure equals net income:
PtCN,t(h) = WtLN,t(h)− TN,t(h). (16)
The above budget constraint assumes that non asset holders set their wage to be the average
wage of the optimizing households. Since ROT consumers face the same labor demand
schedule as the forward looking households, each ROT household works the same number of
hours as the average for asset holding households.
C.3 Monetary and fiscal policy
We assume that the monetary authority sets the gross nominal interest rate Rt according to
the following Taylor rule:
Rt
R
=
[(pit
pi
)φpi (Yt
Y
)φy](1−ρR)(Rt−1
R
)ρR
ςt, (17)
where variables without time subscript indicate steady-state values and pit = Pt/Pt−1 denotes
the rate of inflation of the consumption bundle. The parameters φpi and φy measure the
strength of the response of the short-term nominal interest rate to deviations of the home
CPI inflation rate and domestic output from their respective steady-state values. Interest
rate smoothing is captured by the parameter ρR, and ςt denotes a standard monetary shock,
which follows an AR(1) log-linear stochastic process.
Since the expectation hypothesis holds in this framework, nominal and real long term
rates are related to the expected path of short term rates. For example, the real yield on a
n-period bond at time t, Rrt,t+n, is related to the sequence of one-period real rates as follows:
Rrt,t+n = Et
n−1∏
j=0
(
Rt+j
pit+j+1
)
, (18)
For future reference we define the long term real interest rate as the real yield of a bond of
infinite duration, that is, lim
n→∞
Rrt,t+n.
Following Corsetti, Meier and Mu¨ller (2010), we assume that the government can finance
its spending either through lump-sum taxes, Tt, or through issuance of one-period nominal
bonds, Dt. The budget constraint of the government is:
R−1t Dt+1 = Dt + PH,tGt − Tt, (19)
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where Tt = λTN,t + (1− λ) TA,t, and Gt denotes government spending, which is assumed to
be directed exclusively on domestic goods. Denoting real debt by Drt = Dt/Pt−1 and real
taxes as T rt = Tt/Pt, we let fiscal policy be described by the following feedback rule:
Gt = (1− ρ)G+ ρGt−1 + ψGDD
r
t + θt, (20)
T rt = G
(
PH,tGt
PtG
)ψTG
+ ψTDD
r
t , (21)
where θt denote exogenous i.i.d. shocks to government spending. The response of government
spending to government debt is captured by the parameter ψGD, while the parameters ψTG
and ψTD capture the responsiveness of taxes to government spending and debt, respectively.
Taxes for asset holders and ROT consumers are assumed to follow the same aggregate rule
defined in equation (21).
C.4 Equilibrium
Market clearing requires that the supply of intermediate goods equals government spending
plus total demand from home and foreign final good firms. The demand for a particular
variety of the home good is therefore defined by:
YH,t(i) =
[
PH,t(i)
PH,t
]−εY,t [v
2
Pt
PH,t
Ct +
(
1−
v
2
) StP ∗t
PF,t
C∗t +Gt
]
.
Since all firms are identical at equilibrium, aggregating across firms yields the market clearing
condition for the home good:
YH,t =
v
2
Pt
PH,t
Ct +
(
1−
v
2
) StP ∗t
PH,t
C∗t +Gt. (22)
By symmetry, the aggregate market clearing condition for foreign output can be written:
YF,t =
v
2
P ∗t
P ∗F,t
C∗t +
(
1−
v
2
) Pt
StP ∗F,t
Ct + G
∗
t . (23)
In addition, total consumption in the home country is given by:
Ct = λCN,t + (1− λ)CA,t. (24)
An analogous condition holds for the foreign country.
D The international transmission of fiscal policy -Web-
Appendix-
In this section we illustrate the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks by
comparing impulse responses that are produced under different restrictions of the parameter
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space. We begin by illustrating impulse responses in the neo-classical benchmark. Then, we
distinguish between three competing (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) specifications,
which differ by the nature of the restrictions they impose on either the structure of the econ-
omy or the stance of fiscal policy: (i) countercyclical mark-up, (ii) rule of thumb consumers
and (iii) spending reversals. In the last part of this section, we show that despite the differ-
ent set of assumptions, it is possible to identify a number of inequality constraints that are
not overturned by empirically plausible perturbations of the parameter space spanning all
theoretical specifications.
D.1 Parameterization
In Table 5, we report the values taken by the parameters of the model under three spec-
ifications, in each of which only one of the mechanisms for the transmission of fiscal policy
described above is at play. For illustrative purposes, we also report a further restrictive pa-
rameterization, which corresponds to the neo-classical benchmark. The top panel reports
the set of common values, which are relatively standard. The discount factor is set to 0.99,
and government spending is assumed to be 20% of output in steady state, which implies a
private consumption-output ratio of 0.8. Following Cook and Devereux (2011), we set the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution to 2 and the inverse of the Frisch elasticity to 1. The
home bias in consumption is 1.7, which implies an import-output ratio of 0.12 as in Corsetti,
Meier and Mu¨ller (2010), whereas the elasticity of substitution across labor services is set to
4.5 (Gal´ı, 2011). To develop intuition for the logic behind each mechanism, in the illustra-
tive calculations of this section we restrict monetary policy to react only to inflation, with a
parameter of 1.5 as suggested by Taylor (1993). In the nested model used below to derive
the theory-robust sign restrictions, we verify robustness to a range of values for the interest
rate response to output and the smoothing parameter. Finally, the persistence of government
spending is 0.9, consistent with Gal´ı and Perotti (2003).
The neo-classical benchmark in the first column is characterized by monopolistically com-
petitive households and firms, flexible prices (δp = 0), flexible wages, (δw = 0), and balanced
government budget (ψTG = 1). The parameterization in the second column differs from the
neoclassical benchmark only insofar as the mark-up is assumed to be countercyclical. The
remaining two columns belong to the family of new-keynesian models. Beyond the assump-
tions of sticky prices and wages, the model in column three (four) differs from the benchmark
neoclassical model for the introduction of rule of thumb consumers (policy reversals).
In the second column, we select a value for the parameter governing the countercyclicality
of the price markup lying at the lowest range of values that are sufficient to generate an
increase in consumption and a real exchange depreciation in response to an unanticipated
increase in government spending. For higher values of η, the transmission of fiscal policy
would remain qualitatively unchanged. For the new-Keynesian models, we calibrate the
degree of price rigidity so that the probability of keeping prices fixed at any given point in
time is 50% as in Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), implying an average frequency of
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Table 5: Parameterization
description of the parameters values
discount factor β 0.99
consumption-output ratio cy 0.8
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ 2
inverse of Frisch elasticity ϕ 1
home bias in consumption υ 1.7
elasticity of labor substitution εL 4.5
interest rate response to inflation φpi 1.5
interest rate response to output φy 0
interest rate smoothing ρR 0
gov. spending autocorrelation ρ 0.9
theoretical models
NC CM ROT SR
probability of price fixed δp 0 0 0.5 0.5
probability of wage fixed δw 0 0 0.8 0.8
elasticity of markup to demand η 0 1.1 0 0
share of rule of thumb consumers λ 0 0 0.4 0
gov. spending sensitivity of taxes ψTG 1 1 1 0
debt sensitivity of spending ψG 0 0 0 -0.02
debt sensitivity of taxes ψTD 0 0 0 0.02
Note: same values apply to the foreign economy. NC, ROT, CM and SR stands for
Neo-Classical, Rule Of Thumb, Countercyclical Markup and Spending Reversals.
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price adjustment of two quarters. In addition, we assume that in each quarter, the probability
that a household experiences a nominal wage change is 20%, implying a coefficient of δw = 0.8.
This number lies within the range of values consistent with estimates by Barattieri, Basu and
Gottshalk (2014) and Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2008). The share of rule of thumb consumers
in the third model is equal to 0.4, consistent with evidence in Campbell and Mankiw (1989),
and Misra and Surico (2014). The last column refers to the spending reversals model, which
relaxes the assumption of a balanced government budget at each point in time by allowing
spending and taxes to depend on the level of real debt in a way that is consistent with the
evidence in Gal´ı and Perotti (2003). The parameters governing the evolution of government
spending and taxation are calibrated along the lines of Corsetti, Meier and Mu¨ller (2010).13
To illustrate differences and similarities across the three specifications and the neo-classical
benchmark, Table 5 makes clear that in each column there is only one specific mechanism
at play for the transmission of fiscal policy, as the relevant parameters associated with the
identifying features of the other models are set so as to shut down those alternative channels.
D.2 Dynamic responses to a government spending shock
In Figure 13, we present the dynamic responses of domestic and foreign variables to a
domestic government spending shock in the neo-classical benchmark and the three specifi-
cations augmented according to the parameter values in the last three columns of Table ??.
The blue solid line refers to the neo-classical transmission mechanism and the red dots to the
model with countercyclical mark-up. As for the new-Keynesian models, the purple circles
and green squares denote the impulse responses associated with the existence of rule of thumb
consumers and spending reversals, respectively.
13As discussed in Corsetti, Meier and Mueller (2010), a coefficient of ψTD = 0.02 ensures the stationarity
of debt even in the absence of spending reversals, i.e., it ensures that the condition (1 − ψTD)/β < 1 holds
at the calibrated equilibrium.
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Figure 13: Dynamic responses to unanticipated increase in domestic government spending. An increase in the real exchange rate
corresponds to a depreciation. The responses of government spending, taxes and consumption are expressed as a percent of GDP.
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The impulse response analysis uncovers a set of inequality predictions that are shared
by all specifications of our two-country framework. Following a positive fiscal shock, (i)
government spending, Gt, (ii) taxes, Tt/Pt, and (iii) domestic output, YH,t, increase on impact,
while the response of (iv) the government budget surplus, (Tt − PH,tGt)/Pt, is non-positive.
Furthermore, in all models there is a positive comovement between (v) short-term nominal
interest rate and inflation, and (vi) consumption and real exchange rate. As we will show in
the next section, these sign restrictions are robust to empirically plausible changes in model
assumptions and parameter values, and therefore will form the basis for our identification
strategy.
As for the ambiguous predictions, both the countercyclical markup and the spending
reversals models generate a fall in the long-term real interest rate. This is crucial for the
ability of the spending reversals model to produce a positive response of consumption and
boost domestic output. At our calibrated equilibrium, a value of λ = 0.4 is not sufficient
for the interaction between sticky prices and rule of thumb consumers to generate a rise in
private consumption (Gal´ı, Lopez-Salido and Valles, 2007).
Moving to the open economy variables, we note that the neo-classical model yields a
real exchange appreciation stemming from international risk-sharing on consumption, which
further boosts foreign output. A share of 40% ROT consumers instead does not suffice to
reverse the real exchange rate appreciation, but is important to boost the response of foreign
output.
The countercyclical markup and the spending reversals are the only models predicting
a CPI real exchange rate depreciation. The two mechanisms, however, are quite different.
In the countercyclical markup model, an increase in domestic public spending produces a
decline in the markup of domestically sold goods. This triggers a real exchange depreciation
and a decline of foreign output because of the loss of competitiveness abroad. According to
the spending reversals mechanism, in contrast, the domestic fiscal expansion is associated
with both an increase in foreign output and a real exchange depreciation. The reason is that
the expectations of future tax rises are so strong as to generate negative long-term interest
rates at home and abroad, thereby stimulating output globally.
The assumption of wage stickiness allows the spending reversal model to generate a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate and an increase in domestic consumption without relying on
implausibly high values of price stickiness: at our calibrated equilibrium, the signs of the im-
pulse responses in Figure 13 arise independently of the value chosen for price rigidity. Absent
wage stickiness, the spending reversal model would have hard times to generate responses of
consumption and exchange rate like in Figure 13 for values of δp below 0.9.
It is important to emphasize that the assumption of wage rigidity has no consequences
for the identification of the theory-robust sign restrictions described above. Without wage
stickiness, the association between an increase (decrease) in consumption and real exchange
depreciation (appreciation) emerges as a robust prediction of both the rule of thumb con-
sumers and spending reversal models, independently of the degree of price stickiness. The
reason for this result is that, for values of δp below 0.9, consumption and real exchange rate
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switch sign simultaneously in both specifications, thereby generating an additional robust
prediction that can be exploited in the empirical analysis.
D.3 Theory-robust sign restrictions
The previous section was intended to illustrate differences and similarities in the interna-
tional transmission of fiscal policy across the various specifications. In this section, we check
formally that the sign-restrictions (i) to (vi) are robust to a wide range of perturbations of
the parameter space in a nested framework where rule of thumb consumers, countercyclical
markups, government spending reversals as well as stickiness in wages and prices are allowed
to interact with each other.
The ranges of parameter values used for the simulations of the nesting model are re-
ported in Table 2 and they reflect the ranges of values typically encountered in the empirical
literature. An exception is represented by the share of rule of thumb consumers and the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, whose ranges are set to conservative values. The
reason for this choice is that higher values lead to indeterminacy whenever all transmission
mechanisms are allowed to operate simultaneously. Indeed, a high share of rule of thumb
consumers makes the model prone to indeterminacy, particularly in the presence of coun-
tercyclical markups. As a sensitivity check, however, we have verified that our results are
robust to applying values of λ ∈ [0, 0.3] and σ ∈ [1, 20] to the benchmark specification, namely
setting η = 0 but letting all other parameters to vary as in Table 2.14
Table 7 reports the sign restrictions implied by the model for an extended set of shocks
that buffet our model economy, namely fiscal, TFP, monetary, preferences, labor supply
and markup shocks. In this table we restrict attention to the same variables reported in
Table 1: government spending, taxes, primary budget surplus, output and the correlations
between consumption and real exchange rate, and inflation and nominal interest rate. For
each shock, we have computed impulse responses by drawing parameter values from the
uniform distributions in Table 2 over 10,000 repetitions. In addition, we have assumed
that the autocorrelation coefficients for all the shocks in Table 7 are drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0.7, 0.98], with the exception of monetary shocks, for which the
autocorrelation coefficient has support [0, 0.9] .
Our results for the fiscal shock indicate that the sign restrictions (i) to (iv) are satisfied in
every single draw. The restrictions (v) and (vi) are instead satisfied in 97.7% and 99.4% of the
draws, respectively.15 All sign restrictions for technology, preference, monetary and markup
shocks were satisfied in more than 99% of the draws, while in the case of labor supply shocks
all sign restrictions are satisfied almost 99% of the times. The results indicate that with the
only exception of a fiscal shocks, any other shock that increases output would generate an
14In this setting values of λ above 0.3 significantly enlarge the indeterminacy region.
15The inequality constraints (i) to (vi) are also robust to two significant departures from the model derived
in Section 2: (i) non-unitary trade elasticities along the range of values reported by Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2008), (ii) drawing the parameters in Table 2 independently for the home and foreign economies so
as to break down the assumption of symmetry between the two countries.
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Table 6: Parameter values used in the simulation of the nested model
description of the parameters range
discount factor β 0.99
consumption-output ratio cy [0.75, 0.85]
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ [1, 3.5]
inverse of Frisch elasticity ϕ [0.5, 5]
home bias in consumption v [1.4, 1.9]
elasticity of labor substitution εL [4, 12]
interest rate response to inflation φpi [1.1, 2.0]
interest rate response to output gap φy [0, 0.25]
interest rate smoothing ρR [0, 0.8]
gov. spending autocorrelation ρ [0.7, 0.98]
probability of price fixed δp [0.3, 0.7]
probability of wage fixed δw [0.3, 0.9]
elasticity of markup to demand η [1.1, 1.3]
share of rule of thumb consumers λ [0, 0.15]
gov. spending sensitivity of taxes ψTG [0, 0.5]
debt sensitivity of spending ψGD [−0.02,−0.04]
debt sensitivity of taxes ψTD [0.02, 0.04]
Note: Parameter values are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. Same
ranges apply to the foreign economy. Results are based on 10,000 repetitions.
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Table 7: Theoretical sign restrictions: all shocks
Fiscal TFP Monetary Pref. L. Supply Mark-up
θ Ψ ς ϑ χ ξ
government spending ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
taxation ≥ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0
budget surplus (at t = 2) ≤ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
domestic output ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
correl.(pˆit, rˆt) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 N/A ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
correl. (Ct, Qt) ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0
increase in the budget surplus, a decrease in real debt and, through equation (21), a decrease
in taxes. Hence, fiscal shocks are uniquely identified, in our model, by the joint response of
output, budget surplus and taxes.
On the basis of this finding, our theory-based strategy to identify a fiscal shock in the
data is to impose the common sign restrictions (i) to (vi) onto the factor model of Section 3.
E Log linearized system
Households. Let hat lowercase variables denote percent deviations from their steady state
values, with the exception of the interest rate and inflation, where rˆt and pˆit denote deviations
in percentage points. In the problem of the asset holding households, a log-linearization of
the Euler equation (13) yields the following expression:
−σcˆA,t + ϑˆt = −σcˆA,t+1 + ϑˆt+1 + (rˆt − Etpˆit+1).
Defining c˜A,t = (CA,t − CA)/YH as log deviations in output units, the equation above can be
rewritten as follows:
−σc˜A,t + cyϑˆt = −σc˜A,t+1 + cyϑˆt+1 + cy(rˆt − Etpˆit+1), (25)
where cy denotes the output share of consumption and we have made use of the assumption
that steady state consumption is identical across household types, that is, CA = CN = C.
This stationary equilibrium can always be achieved by an appropriate choice of taxes TA and
TN . Similarly, the Euler equation for the foreign country writes:
−σc˜∗A,t = −σc˜
∗
A,t+1 + cy(rˆ
∗
t −E
∗
t pˆi
∗
t+1). (26)
Taking a Taylor expansion of equation (15) around a zero inflation steady state we get the
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following wage setting rule:
wˆ∗t = (1− βδ)
∞∑
s=0
(βδ)sEt
{
m̂rsA,t+s|t + pˆt+s
}
,
where µw = ln εL
εL−1
. Using m̂rsA,t = χˆt + σcˆA,t + ϕlˆA,t and a log-linear approximation of the
labor demand equation (10) we can write:
m̂rsA,t+s|t = m̂rsA,t+s + ϕ
(
lˆA,t+s|t − lˆA,t+s
)
= m̂rsA,t+s − εLϕ (wˆ
∗
t − wˆt+s) .
Combining the two equations above and rearranging we get:
wˆ∗t =
1− βδ
1 + εϕ
(m̂rsA,t + pˆt + εϕwˆt) + βδEtwˆ
∗
t+1
A log linear approximation of the wage index reads as follows:
wˆt = δwwˆt−1 + (1− δw)wˆ
∗
t .
These last two equations can be combined to get the wage Phillips Curve:
pˆiwt = κ
w
(
σc˜A,t + cyχˆt + cyϕlˆA,t − cywˆ
r
t
)
+ βEtpˆi
w
t+1, (27)
where κw = (1−βδ)(1−δ)
δ[1+εLϕ]
and wˆrt denotes deviations of the real wage from its steady-state value.
The wage inflation equation for the foreign country reads:
pˆiw∗t = κ
w
(
σc˜∗A,t + cyϕlˆ
∗
A,t − cywˆ
r∗
t
)
+ βEtpˆi
w∗
t+1. (28)
In addition, the change in the real wage can be expressed as the difference between nominal
wage inflation and CPI inflation:
wˆrt = wˆ
r
t−1 + pˆi
w
t − pˆit, (29)
In the foreign country, the following symmetric equation holds:
wˆr∗t = wˆ
r∗
t−1 + pˆi
w∗
t − pˆi
∗
t . (30)
The budget constraint for the ROT consumers in equation (16) can be linearized as follows:
YH c˜N,t =
WLN
P
(
wˆrt + lˆN,t
)
− YH t˜ax
r
t ,
where t˜ax
r
t =
(TN,t/Pt−TN/P)
YH
. Since LA = LN = L, the above equation can be rewritten as:
c˜N,t = wˆ
r
t + lˆN,t − t˜ax
r
t . (31)
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An analogous equation will determine consumption for the ROT households in the foreign
country:
c˜∗N,t = wˆ
r∗
t + lˆ
∗
N,t − t˜ax
r∗
t . (32)
Since forward-looking and ROT consumers are paid the same wage and face the same labor
demand schedule, their labor supply will be identical, both in the home and in the foreign
country:
lˆN,t = lˆA,t, (33)
lˆ∗N,t = lˆ
∗
A,t. (34)
From the problem of the asset holding households, the interest rate parity condition in equa-
tion (14) can be linearized and written:
σc˜t − cyϑˆt = σc˜
∗
t + cy(v − 1)τˆt. (35)
Firms. The linearized production function for the home and the foreign countries can be
written as follows:
yˆt = Ψˆt + lˆt, (36)
yˆ∗t = lˆ
∗
t . (37)
Using the first order condition in equation (8) and the law of motion for the price index in
equation (9) we can derive the Phillips curve for the home and the foreign economy:
pˆiH,t =
(1− βδp) (1− δp)
δp
[
wˆrt − ηyˆt +
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt
]
+ EtβpˆiHt+1, (38)
pˆiF,t =
(1− βδp) (1− δp)
δp
[
wˆr∗t − ηyˆ
∗
t −
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt
]
+ EtβpˆiF,t+1. (39)
Term structure. A log-linearization of equation (18) around the stationary equilibrium
can be used to express the real yield on a bond of infinite duration expressed in deviations
from the steady state and denoted by r¯rt , as the infinite sum of expected short-term real rates:
r¯rt = Et
∞∑
j=0
(
rˆrt+j − pˆit+1
)
.
Iterating forward on equation (25), and using the assumption that the model is stationary
and therefore consumption reverts to its steady state value (i.e., lims→∞ ct+s = 0), r¯
r
t can be
rewritten as a function of consumption in log deviations from output:
r¯rt =
−σc˜A,t
cy
. (40)
A similar relationship holds for the foreign country:
r¯r∗t =
−σc˜∗A,t
cy
. (41)
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Price indices, terms of trade and real exchange rate. Having defined the real ex-
change rate as Qt = StP
∗
t /Pt and home terms of trade as Tt = StP
∗
F,t/PH,t, substituting the
price indices into Qt it is possible to derive the following linearized relationship:
qˆt = (v − 1) τˆt (42)
Using the definition of the price indices it is possible to derive the following expressions for
domestic and foreign CPI inflation:
pˆit = pˆiH,t +
(
1−
v
2
)
(τˆt − τˆt−1) , (43)
pˆi∗t = pˆiF,t −
(
1−
v
2
)
(τˆt − τˆt−1) . (44)
Monetary and fiscal policies. Linearizing the Taylor rule in equation (17) yields the two
following expressions for the home and the foreign country:
rˆt = ρRrˆt−1 + (1− ρR)
[
φpipˆit + φyyˆy
]
+ ςˆt, (45)
rˆ∗t = ρRrˆ
∗
t−1 + (1− ρR)
[
φpipˆi
∗
t + φyyˆ
∗
y
]
. (46)
Denoting g˜t = (Gt −G) /YH and d˜
r
t = Dt/ (Pt−1YH), the government spending feedback rule
in (20) becomes for the home and the foreign country:
g˜t = ρGg˜t−1 + ψGDd˜
r
t + et, (47)
g˜∗t = ρGg˜
∗
t−1 + ψGDd˜
r∗
t . (48)
Linearizing the tax feedback rule in equation (21) yields the following expressions for the
home and the foreign country:
t˜ax
r
t = ψTG
[
g˜t − (1− cy)
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt
]
+ ψTDd˜
r
t , (49)
t˜ax
r∗
t = ψTG
[
g˜∗t + (1− cy)
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt
]
+ ψTDd˜
r∗
t . (50)
The log-linearized conditions for the domestic government budget constraint in equation (19)
can be written as follows:
βd˜rt = d˜
r
t−1 − (1− cy)
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt−1 + g˜t−1 − t˜ax
r
t−1. (51)
A similar condition holds for the foreign country:
βd˜r∗t = d˜
r∗
t−1 + (1− cy)
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt−1 + g˜
∗
t−1 − t˜ax
r∗
t−1. (52)
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Equilibrium. The linearized expression for aggregate consumption in equation (24) reads
as follows:
c˜t = λc˜N,t + (1− λ)c˜A,t, (53)
while the analogous equation for the foreign country writes:
c˜∗t = λc˜
∗
N,t + (1− λ)c˜
∗
A,t. (54)
In order to linearize the market clearing condition for the home good in equation (22) it is
convenient to express Pt/PH,t = T
1−v/2
t and SP
∗/PH = T
v/2
t . Substituting for consumption
and government spending in deviations from output yields:
yˆH,t =
v
2
c˜t +
(
1−
v
2
)
c˜∗t + 2cy
v
2
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt + g˜t, (55)
where g˜t = (Gt−G)/YH . The market clearing condition for the foreign economy in equation
(23) can be rearranged in a similar way to write:
yˆ∗F,t =
v
2
c˜∗t +
(
1−
v
2
)
c˜t − 2cy
v
2
(
1−
v
2
)
τˆt + g˜
∗
t . (56)
Equations (25) to (56) provide a complete characterization of the dynamic system used
in the simulations.
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